The Carnival of Popularity by O'Kane, Paul
Title The  Ca r nival of Popula ri ty
Type Article
URL h t t p s://ual r e s e a r c ho nline. a r t s . ac.uk/id/e p rin t/150 1 8/
Dat e 2 0 1 9
Cit a tion O'Ka n e,  Paul (2019) The  Ca r nival of Pop ula ri ty. Thi rd  Text  
Online.  
C r e a to r s O'Ka n e,  Paul
U s a g e  Gui d e l i n e s
Ple a s e  r ef e r  to  u s a g e  g uid elines  a t  
h t t p://u al r e s e a r c ho nline. a r t s . ac.uk/policies.h t ml  o r  al t e r n a tively con t a c t  
u al r e s e a r c honline@ a r t s. ac.uk .
Lice ns e:  Cr e a tive  Co m m o ns  Att rib u tion  N o n-co m m e rcial No  De riva tives
U nless  o t h e r wise  s t a t e d,  copyrig h t  ow n e d  by t h e  a u t ho r




Shetland Islanders’ Old Norse Kings Festival, 1927, still image courtesy of the British Film Institute [1] 
 
Professional artists and art critics might assume that art has a progressive influence on wider 
society, but it is difficult to deny that the evaluation of art also plays a significant role in 
establishing and maintaining class divides. Art’s appreciation tends to separate according to 
modes of interpretation, levels of sophistication, taste, or tendencies to criticality or 
complicity. These dividing lines have, however, also long been the target of artists’ and 
critics’ attention. Claes Oldenburg, in his 1961 POP manifesto I Am For An 
Art enthusiastically embraces the popular while nevertheless viewing it from an avant-garde 
perspective (recalling that POP was initially referred to as ‘neo-Dada’). He writes: 
I am for an art that embroils itself with the everyday crap & still comes out on 
top. 
I am for all art that takes its form from the lines of life itself, that twists and 
extends and accumulates and spits and drips, and is heavy and coarse and blunt 
and sweet and stupid as life itself. 
… I am for Kool art, 7UP art, Pepsi art, Sunshine art, 39 cents art, 15 cents art, 
Vatronol art, Dro-bomb art, Vam art, Menthol art, L & M art, Ex-lax art, 
Venida art, Heaven Hill art, Pamryl art, San-o-med art, Rx art, 9.99 art, Now 
art, New art, How art, Fire Sale art, Last Chance art, Only art, Diamond art, 
Tomorrow art, Franks art, Ducks art, Meat-o-rama art. [2] 
Here the turmoil of bargain-basement consumerism becomes refreshing material for 
the professional artist and his informed audience, but it is also a sign of a distinction 
between two different economies and lifestyles, one of which tends towards uncritical 
consumption while the other enjoys a ‘behind the scenes’ perspective wise to the 
exploitative nexus of capitalism and media. Ironically, this privilege is not shareable 
with those who could benefit most from its insights. So, while Oldenburg’s 
rummaging in popular culture turns up signs that can be redeployed strategically in 
the arena of the professional art world, it leaves us to question whether he is thereby 
softening or hardening the border between the two. 
Artists are, of course, not only interested in POP but also popularity. Jeff Koons, perhaps 
under a Warholian influence, founded his career on personal fame as much as on works of art 
that linked Disneyesque Americana to the kind of hyperbolic imagery associated with kitsch 
craft traditions of toy, ornament, bauble and souvenir making. Warhol himself once claimed 
(apparently uncritically but surely strategically) that POP is ‘liking things’, a phrase that 
clearly resonates with today’s click-happy social media generation who, hyper conscious of 
their own likeability, barely have time to make critically considered responses to their fast 
moving, largely virtual cultural environment.  
Clement Greenberg – whose essay ‘The Avant Garde and Kitsch’ first appeared in 
1939, [3]  at about the same time as Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’ [4] – rather snobbishly derided as ‘kitsch’ all mass-produced and 
imitative, poor quality arts designed to exploit and placate the desires of the newly urbanised 
modern masses. However, he referred inadequately to ways in which modernity had forcibly 
separated those masses from their own arts, cultures and traditions, and how those traditions 
were, and continue to be, mimicked, lampooned, appropriated and sold back to the working 
classes by the more empowered professional classes (and thus become kitsch). Benjamin, 
however, took a little more trouble to imagine how the (then) new media of photography, 
cinema, illustrated newspapers, gramophone recordings, etc, might provide means by which 
the working classes could claim or reclaim an art, culture, and maybe even a little dignity and 
sovereignty of their own, despite being displaced, disempowered and disenfranchised by 
urbanising and industrialising capitalist modernity and attendant middle-class centrality. 
Benjamin’s optimistic vision might even link a modern marginal figure like Charlie 
Chaplin’s tramp (championed by Benjamin) to a pre-modern carnival tradition (see below) in 
which a poor man can be king for a day. In his ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’ essay, Benjamin also noted how social conflict, and eventual war, inevitably 
occur whenever capitalism flexes and fails on such a scale that, just when it requires 
wholesale replacement or adjustment by, for example, eliminating the tense primary 
distinction between the middle and working classes, it chooses instead to rescue and reinstate 
itself in its familiar form, shoring up its central players and primary operatives while damning 
others. This manoeuvre includes throwing the working class the bone of a mere means with 
which to ‘express themselves’, perhaps through the spectacular excitement of crude 
plebiscitary politics and/or dictatorship, complete with uniforms, rallies and simplistic 
slogans. Benjamin writes: 
Fascism attempts to organise the newly created proletarian masses without 
affecting the property structure which the masses strive to eliminate. Fascism 
sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to 
express themselves. [5] 
Contentious encounters in art between the professional (as rarified and exceptional) and the 
popular (as accessible and ubiquitous) thus have a long, rich history and point to an inter-
class tension that is constitutive of modernity. Romantic art, executed for and enjoyed by a 
privileged class, took an overt interest in the lower classes and their arts and crafts. Thus, a 
Beethoven symphony might allude to idyllic landscape but could also echo the jigs and reels 
of country folk or even mark the event of the French Revolution. Wordsworth and 
Coleridge’s groundbreaking Lyrical Ballads include poems about the poor, rural, itinerant 
and disabled. In Goethe, ‘ordinary people’ also feature significantly, albeit carefully placed 
around the edges of more ornate, aristocratic lives. Such relationships between ‘high’ and 
‘low’ culture can, then, be more or less marked by a condescending emulation on the part of 
those more privileged who might draw into their cultural net a little of the ‘charm’ of the poor 
and the rustic. However, in the 1840s Charles Baudelaire encouraged Parisian artists to take a 
more modern approach, inviting them to embrace the ‘… pageant of fashionable life and 
thousands of floating existences … which drift about in the underworld of a great city’. [6] He 
also pointed to news media as a source for contemporary artists’ subject matter. In her 2009 
essay ‘In Defense of the Poor Image’, artist, theorist and educator Hito Steyerl might be said 
to continue this approach by championing low-res, fast moving, poor quality digital images 
such as those found on YouTube, Facebook, Ubuweb, etc, as she encourages artists to see 
these as potentially subversive, progressive vehicles that might extend a legacy connecting 
Baudelaire’s realism to DADA’s anti-fascist collage, and POP. Steyerl writes: 
On the one hand, the economy of poor images, with its immediate possibility of 
worldwide distribution and its ethics of remix and appropriation, enables the 
participation of a much larger group of producers than ever before. … While it 
enables the users’ active participation in the creation and distribution of 
content, it also drafts them into production. Users become the editors, critics, 
translators, and (co-) authors of poor images.… Poor images are thus popular 
images – images that can be made and seen by the many. They express all the 
contradictions of the contemporary crowd: its opportunism, narcissism, desire 
for autonomy and creation, its inability to focus or make up its mind, its 
constant readiness for transgression and simultaneous submission. … The 
condition of the images speaks not only of countless transfers and 
reformattings, but also of the countless people who cared enough about them to 
convert them over and over again, to add subtitles, reedit, or upload them. [7] 
In sources as apparently diverse as Steyerl and Baudelaire then, we can find appeals to 
professional artists to recognise, embrace and contend not just with popular imagery and 
popular culture but also with popularity, as ways of maintaining art’s and the artists’ 
relevance to dramatically changing times.  
In the 1990s, Greil Marcus’s book Lipstick Traces provided an intellectual history of 1970s 
Punk culture allied to French 1950s and ’60s Situationism. Marcus thereby contributed a rare 
and effective example of how relatively esoteric European art theories and practices can be 
successfully translated into disruptive, progressive popular art and action. Around the same 
time, the critic and theorist Dave Hickey published a collection of innovative and slightly 
notorious essays titled Air Guitar. This book involves a provocative criticism of what Hickey 
perceived as an inappropriately narrow and over-academicised strain of art writing. It 
demonstrates a passionate concern for working class culture, replete with custom cars, neon 
lights, popular music and far from politically correct language. Hickey writes in his preface: 
… I have never taken anything printed in a book to heart that was not somehow 
confirmed in my ordinary experience – and that did not, to some extent, reform 
and redeem that experience. Nor have I had any experience of high art that was 
not somehow confirmed in my experience of ordinary culture, and that did not, 
to some extent, reform and redeem that. So I have tried to reinstate the 
connective tissues here, and, in the process, have written an odd sort of 
memoir ... [8] 
He ends his preface claiming that his writings are ‘love songs for people who live in a 
democracy’, [9] thus subtly building bridges between fine art, sentiment, sentimentality, 
popular culture and politics. 
Mikhail Bakhtin, working in the reputedly stifling political and cultural climate of the Soviet 
Union, suggested an alternative system of political representation, class equality and 
distributed power, conveniently summarised in his affirmation of ‘The Carnival and the 
Carnivalesque’ (the name he gave to a short essay). [10] According to Bakhtin, in pre-modern 
times (roughly the medieval to the Renaissance period), the majority of the labouring 
classes annually, and for several days, weeks and even months (particularly following the 
harvest when seasonal work was complete and an atmosphere of plenty and rest prevailed), 
played out liberation from the established order and performed their own exceptions to it. In 
carnivalesque parades and games the usual hierarchy of ruler and ruled, sense and nonsense, 
common and rare, father and son, fool and king, civility and barbarism, valued and disdained, 
even faeces and gold, were temporarily suspended, disrupted, exchanged or inverted. Given 
the context in which Bakhtin wrote (the Soviet Union of the 1950s) he may have been 
surreptitiously and subtly, although no less provocatively, appealing to different ways and 
means of acknowledging the revolutionary modern grail of ‘equality’ held up as central to 
both the aims of the French (bourgeois) Revolution and the Russian (communist) Revolution. 
Bakhtin’s pre-modern carnivalesque ‘equality’ is, however, not clumsily imposed and 
granted from above by a well-meaning but unwieldy modern state; rather, it provides a model 
wherein every difference, just like every dog or saint, might have its day. Indeed, carnival 
and the carnivalesque provide a model wherein difference itself has its day.  
While writing this article, my attention was distracted by one example of the rapidly shared, 
poor quality, online video clips referred to by Hito Steyerl above. It is a promotion for an 
archival facility serving the history of cinema and features a 1927 documentation of a 
carnival in the Shetland Isles, a northerly and remote part of Britain. The clip (see here, or 
here) shows crowds of ‘ordinary people’ (inhabitants of rural villages and fishing 
communities) outrageously but also painstakingly and imaginatively costumed, parading and 
performing ‘extra-ordinary’ staged scenarios. NB: if I repeatedly write ‘ordinary people’ 
here, even within inverted commas, I may appear to be continuing to expose the way in 
which art and its evaluation creates or constitutes borders between cultures – and yet, the 
reason this particular video clip is of interest is precisely because it seems to show 
close similarities between what those in the film are doing and what some contemporary 
professional artists may be trying to do (see below). Bakhtin mapped historically how the 
carnival and carnivalesque eventually dwindled in cultural importance around the time of the 
Renaissance (which he marks as the beginning of modernity), but he also suggested that 
carnival and the carnivalesque persists, irrepressibly, in pockets of cultural activity into and 
through the modern period. Thus we might continue to locate and identify it today, perhaps 
seeing the historical legacy of Bakhtin’s ‘carnivalesque’ played out in contemporary art. 
Examples are surely legion, but here are just a few: in Anthea Hamilton’s recent performance 
installation The Squash at Tate Britain, [11] revered and respected modern art works were 
repositioned and recontextualised by the artist and then subjected to the masked, costumed 
activities of a performer in a disruptive, discomforting and occasionally charming dialogue 
between artist, audience, art and context. Meanwhile, Monster Chetwynd’s [12] 2012 Turner 
Prize installation involved performers who brought the carnivalesque inside the established 
and hallowed space of the prestigious institution as if to reclaim it as a popular space, or 
perhaps to reveal, by contrast, just how unlike a public space the Tate’s version of a white 
cube space really is. [13] An installation by Haegue Yang at the South London Gallery in 2019 
was not content to just occupy walls and floors according to the traditions of painting and 
sculpture, but was daily cajoled into a more public life by curatorial assistants who moved the 
artist’s ornate sculptural objects around the space as if in a procession. [14] 
These artists and their works might remind us that carnival is an event wherein the 
overarching logic of any instated regime is revealed as bearable and sustainable only if it is 
mutable, regularly or continuously (even if symbolically) dissipated, relinquished and 
redistributed. Similarly, today, those who enjoy the benefits of our modern democracy cannot 
be complacent about nor assume anything permanent regarding our democracy. Recent 
events clearly reveal that we are involved in an increasingly difficult battle (or ‘constant 
combat’ according to Gilles Deleuze) [15] not just to rescue and defend democracy but to 
update, improve and extend it, and this means including and sharing that democracy with 
more, new, different and ‘other’ people who may not yet have been able to enjoy its benefits, 
and who can in turn contribute to it by bringing their own ideas, cultures, values and needs, to 
explore, expand and test its potential. While we might picture modern democracy as having 
emerged from revolution, its inherent and constitutive tension, turmoil and debate also show 
that democracy is the revolution, officially instated perhaps but still constantly fought over 
and transformed. We can relate this to Deleuze’s definition of the Left as a force that is never 
in power but always and only ever marginal, virtual and imminent [16] – ie always debating 
and creating the next group of rights that will prepare and allow the next communities, 
the next ‘others’ to enter, enjoy and extend democracy.  
In 1968, worldwide revolutionary actions, although brimming with hopes of youthful 
renewal, famously foundered on the limits of possible collaboration between the middle and 
working class, represented by students and factory workers. Meanwhile, attempts to lead 
modern revolution beyond its bourgeois stage on to a supposedly more inclusive and 
democratic age of the rule of the proletariat have mainly been demonstrated as failed or 
crushed attempts – as in, for example, China and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the 
discrediting of such political leviathans may have led us on to strive for more ambitious 
goals, and so today, rather than advocating the ascendancy of a single, oppressed class who 
are difficult to identify or define (other than to say they have been routinely abused and 
exploited as an intrinsic aspect of the structure of capitalism) we seem to be expanding the 
notion of modern revolutionary rights and democracy in the direction of a ‘rule of 
difference’, even entering the epoch of the reign of a quasi-Bacchanalian play that involves a 
more festive and holistic appreciation of everything as other to everything else and everyone 
as other to everyone else.  
The current state of modern revolution, embodied in the form of a dynamic democracy, is a 
society that proudly revels in its potential for liberal inclusivity, diversity and tolerance but 
which rarely acknowledges the rule over – or at the centre of – that democracy by ‘a’ or ‘the’ 
middle class  (if not as a definable object then at least as a symbol or aspiration). In 2017, 
President Macron of France spoke directly and confidently to the ascendant populists in 
Washington DC, reminding them that the ‘middle classes remain the backbone of our 
democracies’. [17] However, it is not only President Trump and his accomplices who might 
disagree with this assertion, but also a figure on the radical Left of French thought and 
politics: Jacques Rancière. Rancière’s disruptive thinking couldn’t be more distant from the 
stabilising anatomical image conjured by Macron. Rancière proclaims ‘we do not aspire to 
equality, we start from equality’ (my italics), [18] and this short statement might contain the 
potential to expose the fact that class divisions, emerging from the French Revolution, remain 
intrinsic to modern society, and furthermore that a complacent and condescending conceit is 
habitually concealed within the commonly assumed benign and noble aspiration to 
(eventually, possibly, gradually, affordably) placate and liberate the working class (and 
perhaps all other ‘others’) according to parsimonious promises of, for example, a ‘minimum’, 
‘standard’ or ‘living’ wage. Meanwhile the professional classes, regarded as justifiably 
‘central’ (‘the backbone’), enjoy making real money (‘disposable income’) while acquiring 
and inheriting property, cultivating ‘work-life’ or ‘work-leisure balance’, accumulating 
adequate pensions and racking up numerous other socio-economic advantages that cannot be 
rationally justified as fair or equal in a modern sense, except according to a self-legitimising 
logic (just as big business tends to inspect its own books, award its own bonuses and in 
ethical respects metaphorically ‘mark its own homework’). Rancière’s brief 
statement thereby exposes a huge and hegemonic imbalance at the heart of our modern 
capitalist democracy, one that stimulates a justified sense of marginalisation and indignation 
on the part of the working class.  
In what are perhaps his most eccentrically radical studies, Proletarian Nights and The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster,[19] Rancière also takes pains to stress that the supposedly 
‘uneducated’ classes (defined by their relative education as well as their relative wealth) are 
nevertheless replete with their own cultures, capabilities, resources, histories, knowledges, 
languages, values, judgements, esoterica and sophistications – ie with their own (and 
‘different’) means of political, cultural, philosophical and aesthetic representation. Although 
crucially, Rancière seems to imply, these can only be revealed once a presumptuously 
superior and judgmental gaze that imposes cultural restraint and hierarchisation (albeit 
oblivious to its hegemonic omnipresence) is removed from perceptions of working-class 
activity, a removal that might also annul perception of ‘them’ as other.   
The middle classes who emerged from modern revolution ‘owning’ its democracy and 
occupying its ‘centre ground’ have, meanwhile, maintained and developed ample means of 
representing their own territory and themselves, including the entire apparatus that is 
habitually referred to as ‘art’, ‘fine art’ or ‘the art world’: a huge, complex, publicly and 
privately supported network of organs offering a kaleidoscopic range of views and visions, 
both of its treasured artefacts and of itself. However, despite post-revolutionary modern 
rhetoric informed by terms like ‘fraternity’, ‘inclusivity’, and more recently ‘transparency’, 
our democracy remains dangerously and insidiously divided by what has been rightly 
referred to as a ‘class ceiling’, although ‘two-way mirror’ may be a better analogy given that 
the working classes, while pruriently observed as others in numerous soap operas, reality TV 
shows, etc, are disadvantaged by being denied their own equivalent system by which to 
return the gaze and critically watch those who watch them. It may, then, also be the case that 
the working classes are denied any equal and adequate means of representing themselves 
with any nuance, ie other than as a mass or an entire class. The scenarios described by 
Greenberg and Benjamin, and the diminution of carnival in modernity bemoaned by Bakhtin, 
all seem to point to a steady depletion of modern working class cultural representation that 
might prove just as painful and troublesome to the ideal of a peaceful, diverse, fair and shared 
democracy as does any purely financial or material inequality.   
The example provided by the Shetland Islanders in 1927, dressed as cartoonish animals and 
parading and performing in truly bizarre fashion, seems however to show or suggest 
‘ordinary people’ deploying the class-crossing form of the carnival and carnivalesque while 
taking care and pains (and perhaps even ‘taking back’) cultural and political representation by 
means of carefully created objects, images and events. ‘They’ thereby appear to demonstrate 
a form of non-professional art that can be proudly claimed as their own, and by parading and 
performing in this playful way a serious political representation is also made. Politics and 
culture, the aesthetic and the political, are fused within the carnivalesque, which bridges 
perceived distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, working and middle classes, rich and 
poor, coarse and fine, younger and older generations, the popular and the esoteric (in this way 
the special inclusivity of carnival also provides a promising model of the holistic).  
In our current moment of political, cultural and inter-class crisis, when the ever-pragmatic 
'central' and relatively empowered middle classes might feel justifiably eager to hide within 
the esoteric realm of a cultural silo, or be tempted to turn away from the plight, anger and 
anxiety of a newly volatilised and correspondingly demonised working class, the 
carnivalesque, with its promised 'reign of difference' may provide a model by means of which 
our shared society might progress more broadly and holistically. Taking this pre-modern 
form as our example, we might find ways to deal with (rather than defer or deny) the 
significant imbalance hard-wired into the democratic settlement of the modern revolution. 
The carnivalesque, in its potential to pool and exchange relative, different and respective arts, 
crafts, beliefs, aims, knowledges and economies, might provide the relatively delimited realm 
of professional ‘fine’ art with an acceptable form, not only of the popular but perhaps even of 
populism. Populism, a concept of which we are currently and justifiably afraid, and with 
which we are appalled, may yet be a cultural phenomenon that needs to be confronted 
sampled, digested, understood and somehow eventually integrated as our progressive modern 
democracy morphs uncomfortably into its next, more complex but hopefully fairer form. By 
following this parade, the bizarre march of the carnival and the carnivalesque, the popular 
might just be wrested from populism and the notion of populism possibly detourned.  
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